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Release for Theis International News Service

r

There is no place in the national intereat for conflicting
Democratic and Republican !oreian policies.

The ieauea which hnve been

r laed by aggreeeive communism con!ront ua all, Democrata and Republican•
alike.

V. e will meet them aucceeefully only i! we face them together.

To eay thil, however, i8 not to aay that there la no room for
individual viewpoint•, for debate and diacuaaion of every baue which arlaee.
It aimply meana that both pa.rUea avoid eeeklna partban

~dvantaaea

out of the

diCficultiee which face the nation. It meana that the advice of both partlea ia
aought in the Senate and eleewbere in formulatinl policlea to deal with the
dif!icultlea. It meana that both partie a cloae rank a behind a united policy
once it hae been aet.
That i8 the e . .ence of bi-partiaanablp.

My party favora thla

approach. 1 believe that member• o£ the other party aleo !avor it. In
general, both partie a have abided by it in recent yeara.
The ayatem of bi-partiaanahip, however, baa been atrained
during the laat few montha, largely becau•e of the aituatlon ln Indochina and
the Geneva Conference.

PeJ"hapa the principal rea•on for thh baa been the

attempt to ahift the blame for the failure o£ policy in Indochina where it doee
not belong. No aooner bad the impendina failure become evident when the
eearcb beaan for ecapegoata.

The name• of the former Preaident and

- zcretary of S

te w re brought up by 1

dina member• of the oth r party.

So, too, were tho• ancient place name• of Yalta, Teheran and Pot•dam.
Th •• attempt.•

r

made for partban purpo•e and

ere re1hted ju1ti.fiably

by my party.

We have ot to examine the

c~e•

of the failure in Indochina

in order to prevent 1lmitar occurrence• in the futUJoe.

But if 1uch an

xaminatton i l to be u1eful to the nation, it mu•t be free of partlaan•hip.
Furth rmore, if

e

re to retain bl-partiaanehip, lt i• eaeential

that both parUe• be taken into confidence before policy 11 1d. Thb wa. not
the ca.e ln the early

•taa•• of the developing Indochina crllb.

Finally, biparti•an•hip depend• on having a clear-cut underltandable policy behind which decent men can unite and to which !ree natiotU
will be drawn. In recent month• too many ofliclall of the Adminbtratlon
have been b•ulng too many confllctlna •tate menta on policy. Aa it h no ,
we •eem to have not one but many lecretarie• of State and all of them talking.
The multitude of voice• aerve• only to eonfu•e the American people and peopl
in friendly countrie1. It apparently doe• not trouble the communilts at all.

We

ant thi• tendency towarda glibne• • •topped.

e want 1 ••

bomba1t, fewer loud worda and an end to confueion.
All of the !actoYe which are mentioned above -- tardy and
~quate

blpartban con•ult.atiou, conflicting 1tatementa on policy, at n-

dency to equate loud word.a with 1trength -- all of theae {actor• undermined

.r

American diplomacy at the Geneva Conference, Furthermore, they helped
to cury the country to the brink of military involvement in Indochina, an

involvement for which we were ill-prepared.
In pointina out theae deficienciea, I would like to make clear

that 1 do not believe they were the only cauae of the !ailu.re to turn back the
communt.t advance in Indochina. The French and Viet Nameae nationaU•t•
muat share the blame for that failure.
I believe that the Adminiatration will alway• find aupport from
the American people, reaardle•• of party, provided that foreign policy ia
ln the national lntereat, provided it la enunciated clearly and conducted with

dipity and quiet atrength. Only the Preaident can rnake po•aib\e tbia unity

of the people and the parties on foreign policy. The manner in which he
acts to promote or to de•troy bipartiaan•hip la a major te•t of hi• leaderahip.

